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Romania's Recovery after the Economic Crisis 
Claudiu Doltu and Marcel Duhaneanu 
Abstract 
Compared with other countries in the region, Romania reacted slowly 
to the recent economic and financial crisis. After eight years of strong 
growth (200 1-2008), Romania's economic contraction was among the 
most severe in the region. Significant macroeconomic corrections oc-
curred in 2010 but at the cost of compressing the household consump-
tion and the investment. Downward adjusting the domestic demand by 
rapidly decreasing nominal wages and increasing taxes also discour-
aged businesses by increasing uncertainty. Partially, the macroeconom-
ic policy worked well in 2010. However a steady growth in the next 
years will depend on the following three conditions: 1) reducing the 
transaction costs of doing business; 2) building critical infrastructure 
and; 3) raising human capital. 
Introduction 
In the first years of the transition (1990-1996) from a centralized economy to a market 
oriented system Romania recorded minor and slow progresses. From 1997-1999, tough 
macroeconomic and structural policies had been adopted allowing the country to vigor-
ously approach accession to the European Union (EU). After three consecutive years of 
economic contraction (-6.1 in 1997, -4.8 in 1998, and -1.2 in 1999), the economy entered 
on a positive trend of economic growth starting with the year 2000. Between 2002 and 
2008, the Romanian economy increased with an annual average of 6.4%, one of the high-
est economic growths in Central and Eastern Europe. This growth was exceeded only by 
Lithuania (7.5%) and Latvia (7.3%). On the background of the EU accession (2002-
2005), the Romanian economy increased with an annual average of 5.8%. When the EU 
accession became certain (January 1, 1997), the economy increased by 7.9% (1996), and 
the growth remained vigorous in the following two years before the economic crises. In 
2007 and 2008, the economy increased by 6.3% and 7.3%, respectively. Again, only the 
Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) increased with higher rates, but only in 
1997. Estonia and Latvia entered a recession in 2008, one year before Romania was final-
ly contaminated by the world financial crises. 
With a single exception-Poland-in all comparable countries in the region (former 
socialist countries) the world economic and financial crises were associated with reces-
sion. The length of the recession was shorter for some countries and longer for others. 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Lithuania were in recession just one year, in 2009, and turned to 
positive economic growth in 2010. Romania, Croatia, and Estonia were in recession for 
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two consecutive years: the first two countries in 2009-20 I 0, and the third one in 2008-
2009. Latvia stayed in recession for three consecutive years, 2008-2010. 
Table 1: Romania 's Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since 2002 
I '!1111 l'wJ l'ro1 
2002 2003 200~ 2005 2006 2007 200X 200lJ 20 I 0 20 I I 20 I 5 
Bulgaria 4.5 5 6.6 6.2 6.3 6.2 6 -5 0 2 5 
Croatia 5.4 5 4.2 4.2 4.7 5.5 2.4 -5.8 -1.5 1.6 3 
Estonia 7.9 7.6 7.2 9.4 10.6 6.9 -5.1 13 .9 1.8 3.5 3.1 
Hungary 4.4 4.3 4.9 3.5 4 1 0.6 -6.3 0.6 2 3 
Latvia 6.5 7.2 8.7 10.6 12 .2 10 -4.2 - 18 -1 3.3 4 
Lithuania 6.9 10.2 7.4 7.8 7.8 9.8 2.8 14.8 1.3 3.1 3.6 
Poland 1.4 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.8 5 1.7 3.4 3.7 4.3 
Romania 5.1 5.2 8.5 4.2 7.9 6.3 7.3 -7.1 -1.9 1.5 4.2 
Source: World Economic Outlook, 2010 
Table 2: The Length of Recession 
Source: World Economic Outlook, 20 I 0 
Romania's economic contraction associated with the world financial crises started in 
2009 and continued in 2010. In 2009, Romania's GDP declined by 7.1 % compared with 
the previous year and the contraction continued in 2010 (-1.9%). For 2009 and 2010, the 
average economic growth in Romania was -4.5%, one of the most severe corrections, 
being exceeded only by the contractions in the Baltic countries ( -9.5% in Latvia, -6.8% in 
Lithuania, and -6.5% in Estonia). 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections for 2015, Roma-
nia's economic growth may be above the economic growth in comparable countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. However, it is difficult to predict when the pre-crises high 
rates of economic growth will be achieved again. Romania's real economic growth may 
reach 4.2% in 2015, while the projection for the average growth in the region is just 
3.3%. The average economic growth in the region was 5.3% in 2002, 6.5% in 2003, and 
7.5% in 2006. 
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Method 
Based on the analysis of the main macroeconomic statistics (GOP, Consumer Price In-
dex, budget deficit, and current account deficit) for countries in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope in 2002-2009, and estimates and projections for 2011 and 2015, we formulated the 
following assumption: the development in the region will be more uniform over the next 
years . In other words, the new constraints for the public policies (mainly the sustainabil-
ity of the public debt) after the recent major world financial crisis will reduce the maneu-
ver space for the governments. The future growth of these countries will depend mostly 
on the speed and determination of implementing the new generation of reforms focused 
on the following three pillars: reducing the transaction costs of doing business, building 
critical infrastructure, and raising human capital. 
In the first years after the fall of communism, the former socialist countries have had 
an uneven evolution explained mainly by the speed and depth of the first generation of 
reforms. The reforms addressed the liberalization- foreign trade, prices, foreign ex-
change, eliminating/reducing government subsidies-and restoring the private property. 
They were followed by the process of designing and using fundamental market institu-
tions (legal and regulatory framework). Starting with the year 2000, the perspective of 
EU accession was a strong anchor for their credibility and between 2002 and 2007/2008 
they enjoyed high levels of economic growth. In the same time almost all these countries 
accumulated significant disequilibria reflected mainly by the current account deficit. 
Bulgaria and the Baltic States recorded by far the most significant external imbalance in 
2006-2008. Bulgaria reached current account deficits of 18.4% ofGDP in 2006, 26.9% of 
GOP in 2007, and 24.2% of GOP in 2008. The current account deficit mounted to 22.5% 
ofGDP and 22.3% of GOP in Latvia (2006 and 2007), and 15.3% of GOP and 17.2% of 
GOP in Estonia (2006 and 2007). Romania experienced high levels of the current account 
deficit in 2006-2008-1 0.4% of GOP, 13.4% of GOP, and 11.9% ofGDP. 
As long as these countries successfully attracted capital inflows, financing the exter-
nal deficits seemed not to be a difficult task (Doltu & Ouhaneanu, 201 0). However, the 
major adjustments of these deficits, on the background of the world economic and finan-
cial crisis, show that such high levels of deficits are unsustainable in the long run. Their 
rapid and strong adjustment is associated with severe contractions of the GDP. 
The average of the current account deficit for the considered countries (see Table 3) 
was 14.2% of GOP in 2007 and 11.6% in 2008. In 2009, the average current account 
deficit was just 0.4% of GDP. The massive correction of the external disequilibria seems 
to be followed in the next years by more orderly approaches of the domestic policies in 
the region aimed at containing the twin deficit problem (the current account deficit and 
the budget deficit). 
The budget deficits for the next years will be significantly lower compared with the 
situation before the world financial crisis. The average budget deficit for the considered 
countries reached 6.7% of GOP in 2009, when the whole region (except Poland) was in 
recession. Preliminary figures for 2010 show a containment of the budget deficit to an 
average of 5.6% of GOP, and projections for 2011 and 2012 indicate that all governments 
in the region will continue prudent budget policies aimed at reducing the public deficit. 
On average, this could be at 4% of GOP in 2011 and 4.8% ofGDP in 2012. 
More uniform developments are also expected for the inflation rate. The average 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) reached a maximum of 9.1 in 2008, but inflation has been 
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rapidly contained in the following years. In 2010, the average CPI in the region was 2.7% 
and the projections for the next years show that the average CPI will continue to decrease 
(2.6% in 2011 and 2.5% in 2015). If in the past years the countries' performances in 
terms of inflation varied on a wide range, they turned narrower once countries entered the 
EU. The same pattern is even more evident for the future. Projections for 2011 show that 
only Romania and Hungary will continue to experience inflation rates above 3% and for 
2015 no country in the region expects the inflation rate to exceed 3%. 
Table 3: Current Account Deficit 
I ,11111 PIO\ Pill\ 
2002 2003 200-1 2005 2006 2007 200:-i 200lJ 20 I o 20 I I 2015 
Bulgaria -2.4 -5.5 -6.6 12.4 18.4 26.9 24.2 -9.5 -3 -3 . 1 -4 
Croatia -7.5 -5.3 -4.4 -5.5 -6.9 -7.6 -9.2 -5 .3 -3.8 -4 .7 -6.4 
Estonia 10.6 11 .3 11.3 -10 15 .3 17.2 -9.7 4 .5 4.2 3.4 -4 
Hungary -7 -8 -8.4 -7.2 -7.1 -6.5 -7.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 -1.8 
Latvia -6.6 -8.1 12.9 12.5 22.5 22.3 13.1 8.6 5.5 2.9 -2 .5 
Lithuania -5.2 -6.9 -7.6 -7.1 10.7 14.6 12.2 4.2 1.9 0.2 -4.2 
Poland -2.8 -2.5 -4 -1.2 -2 .7 -4.8 -5.1 -1.7 -2.4 -2 .6 -2.4 
Romania -3.3 -5 .8 -8.4 -9.8 10.4 13.4 11.9 -4.5 -5.1 -5.4 -4.9 
Source: World Economic Outlook, 2010 
Table 4: Budget Deficit 
I'IOJ. Pro1 
2002 2003 200-l 2005 200(> 2007 200:-i 200lJ 20 I 0 20 I 1 20 12 
Bulgaria -1.2 -0.4 1.8 1.9 1.1 1.7 -4.7 -3 .8 -I. I -1.8 
Czech 
Republic -6.8 -6.6 -2.9 -3.6 -2 .6 -0.7 -2.7 -5 .8 -5 .2 -4.6 -4.2 
Estonia 0.3 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -1 -1.9 -2 .7 
Latvia -2.3 -1.6 -1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -4.1 -10 .2 -7.7 -7 .9 -7 .3 
Lithuania -1.9 -1.3 -1.5 -0.5 -0.4 -1 -3.3 -9.2 -8.4 -7 -6.9 
Hungary -8.9 -7.2 -6.4 -7.9 -9.4 -5 -3.7 -7.2 -3.8 4.7 -6 .2 
Poland -5 -6.2 -5.4 -4.1 -3.6 -1.9 -3.7 -7.2 -7.9 -6.6 -6 
Romania -2 -1.5 -1.2 -1.2 -2 .2 -2.6 -5.7 -8.6 -7.3 -4.9 -3 .5 
Slovenia -2 .5 -2 .7 -2.2 -1.4 -1.3 0 -1.8 -5 .8 -5 .8 -5.3 -4.7 
Slovakia -5 .8 -2 -1.8 -2.2 -2.6 -1.8 -2.1 -7.9 -8.2 -5 .3 -5 
Source: World Economic Outlook, 20 I 0 
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Table 5: The CPI (Average) 
f'sttm Pro1 Pro1 
2002 2003 200-l 2005 200fl 2007 200X 2009 20 I 0 2111 I 20 I:' 
Bulgaria 5.8 2.3 6.1 6 7.4 7.6 12 2.5 2.2 2.9 3 
Croatia 1.7 1.8 2 3.3 3.2 2.9 6.1 2.4 1.9 2.8 3 
Estonia 3.6 1.3 3 4.1 4.4 6.6 10.4 -0.1 2.5 2 2.5 
Hungary 5.3 4.6 6.8 3.6 3.9 7.9 6.1 4 .2 4.7 3.3 3 
Latvia 2 2.9 6.2 6.9 6.6 10.1 15 .3 3.3 -1.4 0.9 1.4 
Lithuania 0.3 -1.1 1.2 2.7 3.8 5.8 II. I 4 .2 I 1.3 1.7 
Poland 1.9 0.8 3.5 2.1 I 2.5 4.2 3.5 2.4 2.7 2.5 
Romania 22.5 15.3 11.9 9 6.6 4.8 7.8 5.6 7.9 5.2 3 
Source: World Economic Outlook, 20 I 0 
Findings and Predictions 
1. Impressive economic growth on the background of accumulating disequilibria are 
not sustainable in the long run 
With one exception- Poland- in all Central and Eastern Europe, the last world economic 
and financial crisis was associated with severe recession. All countries experienced high 
economic growth before 2008, reaping the benefits of ending the first generation of re-
forms in the transition process. They also enjoyed the good prospects of EU accession 
and the first positive effects of entering the EU. However, they accumulated significant 
disequilibria reflected mainly by the current account deficit and budget deficit. The crisis 
marked strong adjustments of these imbalances and questioned the sustainability of 
growth on the background of accumulation of deficits (domestic and external). 
2. A more orderly development in the region is expected 
Wide differences continued to exist among the Central and Eastern European countries 
(and also the Baltic states) in terms of macroeconomic policies performance. These dif-
ferences could be explained by the different approaches of the reform processes and also 
by the relatively large independence enjoyed by the national governments in following 
their own objectives and setting their economic policies. A more orderly approach sig-
naled by the projections for the next years is now expected. 
3. More uniform economic growth rates 
The prospects for economic growth in the region are good. However, the rates of eco-
nomic growth in the region are expected to be lower compared with the pre-crisis years. 
Also, the differences between countries in terms of real GDP growth are expected to 
narrow. 
4. Lower and more uniform deficits and inflation rates 
arrow differences between the countries in the region are also expected in terms of 
budget deficits, current account deficits, and inflation rates. These prospects could be the 
result of the relatively common approach in their macroeconomic policies, enhanced by 
their various agreements with the IMF and the European Commission. Another argument 
supporting these prospects is the objective of entering the Euro zone. On the one hand, 
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there is no deadline for adopting the Euro. But, on the other hand, for the new member 
states there is no opt-out clause that would allow them to maintain their national curren-
cies. Thus, they will join the Euro zone when they are fully prepared. 
Discussion 
What could be the economic prospects for the Romanian economy in the coming years? 
On the one hand, the general framework for the macroeconomic policies would not be 
too different from the other countries in the region. The monetary policy wi ll continue to 
focus on reducing inflation and the fiscal policy will focus on reducing the budget deficit 
(Government of Romania, 201 0). In other words, no significant changes of any major tax 
and no major public investment programs can be expected. On the other hand, we may 
ask, which can be the engines for economic growth and how can Romania achieve steady 
growth? In other words, how will the future economic growth be different from the pre-
crisis economic growth? 
Before the crisis, the main engines for the economic growth were household con-
sumption and investment (see Table 6) . They were most affected by the consequences of 
the international financial crisis and explain the difficulties encountered by the Romanian 
economy in getting out of the recession. Before the crisis, the economic growth was driv-
en by domestic demand. Consumption contribution to the GDP declined slightly from 
about 79% in 2005 to 74% in 2008. However, investment increased its contribution from 
about 24% in 2005 to about 32% in 2008. 
Table 6: Romanian GDP by Uses 
2005 2006 2007 200X 
GDP 100 100 100 100 
Household consumption 78 .53 77.89 75 .29 74.04 
Government consumption 8.34 7.67 7.62 7.74 
Gross fixed capital formation 23 .72 25 .61 30.20 31.92 
Change in inventories -0.43 0.85 0.77 -0.65 
Net ex ort -10.16 -12 .01 -13 .89 -1 3.04 
Source: Derived and Calculated from the Romanian National Institute of Statistics data, 2005-2008 
The decrease of the domestic demand also explains the GDP contraction in the fol-
lowing two years. The GDP declined by 7.1% in 2009 and 1.9% in 2010. The domestic 
demand declined by 12.8% in 2009 compared to 2009 and with 2.4% in 2010 compared 
with 2009. The main pillars of the domestic demand-household consumption and in-
vestment--declined by about 9% and about 25% in 2009 over the previous year, and by 
about 3.4% and 1.5%, respectively in 2010 over 2009. 
Analyzing the contribution to GDP growth by category of resources in 2005-2008 
we observe that construction and services were by far the most dynamic economic sec-
tors. However, they were the most affected by the financial crisis, once the "cheap money 
era" (easy access to credit, low interest rates) suddenly ended. Their contraction was also 
explained by the severe adjustments made by the government in 2010 when, on the back-
ground of financial crisis, nominal wages in the public sector were reduced by 25% and 
also the value added tax (VAT) was increased from 19% to 24%. 
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Table 7: Domestic Demand, Percentage Change over the Previous Year 
Source: Government of Romania, Ministry of Public Finance, 2011 
Table 8: Contribution to GDP Growth by Category of Resources 
Source: Romanian Nationallnstitute of Statistics, 2009 
No significant changes are expected in the GOP structure for the next years. That 
explains why the Romanian economy is getting out of the recession so slowly. The pro-
jections for the real GOP growth show a slight growth of 1.5% in 2011, 3.9% in 2012, 
and 4.2% in 2015. This means that high economic growth rates like those before 2008 
will not be realistic in the coming years . In other words, a steady growth for Romania 
could be around 4.2-4.5%. As domestic demand remains moderate, the main engine for 
growth will be exports. However, they will strongly depend on developments in the EU, 
which is the main market for the Romanian companies. 
In this context, we turn to another basic scenario for the future development of Ro-
mania. The experience in the last 20 years shows that both the government and the non-
government sectors have been running deficits (Croitoru & Tarhoaca, 2000). External 
financing is needed to offset the discrepancy between investments and national savings. 
Conclusion 
A significant increase of the domestic savings could not be expected at least for the next 
10-20 years . This is not a pessimistic assumption. We consider that domestic saving is 
exclusively the result of higher income at the country level that in turn depends on the 
increase in productivity. Productivity is related with investment, which for the time being 
cannot be expected to significantly increase because of the low amount of domestic ac-
cumulations (savings) and thus a low level of investment. Also, the government indebt-
edness could not be viewed as a major vehicle through which public investments can 
generate sustainable growth. However, there are two reliable external financing sources 
that Romania could use. The fust source is the EU structural funds-money that the 
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European Commission provides to the member states for development. The second relia-
ble source is the foreign direct investments (FDI) . 
Table 9: Correlation between Savings and Investments in 2005-2007 (% of GDP) 
2005 20()(, 2007 
Total economy 
Savings 14.1 15.4 16.8 
Investments 23 .9 25.8 30.2 
Current account deficit -9.8 -10.4 -13.4 
Non-government sector 
Savings 11.2 11.1 12.9 
Investments 19.8 19.3 23.7 
Funding non-government deficit -8.6 -8.2 -10.8 
Government sector 
Savings 2.9 4.3 3.9 
Investments 4.1 6.5 6.5 
Budget deficit -1.2 -2 .2 -2 .6 
Source: Estimates based on the Romanian National Institute for Statistics data, 2009 
So far, Romania has used less than 10% of the total EU money available for 2007 -
2014 and further increase of the absorption capacity will depend on the future changes in 
the public policies' design and implementation. When it comes to attract FDis, before the 
financial crisis, Romania succeeded to change from an unattractive destination for the 
FDis to one of the "champions" of the region, especially after the country joined the 
European Union (Doltu & Duhaneanu, 201 0). The FDI inflows dramatically decreased 
since 2009, from about $13.9 billion in 2008 to about $4.9 billion in 2009 and about $3.2 
billion in 2010. 
Now Romania is in an open competition for attracting FDis with the rest of the 
world. Taking into consideration the previously analyzed macroeconomic milestones for 
development, what should the country do when it comes to attract FDis? Accepting that 
the "fiscal competition" is not an option Uust reducing taxes to attract FDls may just not 
be the best approach), the Government effort may be focused on two directions. 
The first direction is to identify and enhance what the business environments consid-
er as "important factors" in their decision to invest somewhere or to locate somewhere. 
The second direction is to quickly eliminate the main differences from the domestic envi-
ronment and the more attractive environment of the competitors--differences that can be 
viewed as barriers for the FDis. 
On the first direction, the new economic policies should enhance the already existing 
advantages, such as the significant domestic market size and its potential for growth. By 
population, Romania is the seventh largest country in the EU. As long as the living stand-
ard in Romania is well below the EU average, there is enough room for the domestic 
market to get wider and deeper, hand in hand with a sustainable increase of personal 
income. The Romanian consumers are open to new products and habits, and they have a 
remarkable propensity to consume. More, the geographic location of the country allows 
the design of a regional approach. Businesses located in Romania could easily expand to 
the Eastern Europe, Southeast Europe, or Central Asia. 
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Romanian human capital is another existing advantage. Even if Romania is not any-
more a country with cheap labor, the workers can be relatively easily trained for specific 
jobs and are highly educated and motivated. More, the language barrier is not so relevant, 
the younger generations being already trained and open to speaking foreign languages. 
The EU membership provides all the advantages in terms of rules and regulations, 
eliminates the risk of expropriation, guarantees profit repatriation, and eliminates the risk 
of restricting capital transfers. Most of the multinational companies already have a local 
history, and similarities with other successful markets can be easily identified. There are 
no major frequent threats to the security, and the trade unions are not a major barrier for 
businesses. 
On the second direction-to quickly eliminate the main differences between the 
domestic and foreign investment environment in order to make the environment more 
attractive to competitors- solutions could be found by understanding the decision mak-
ing process for individuals wanting to work and live abroad. The factors considered by 
individuals are also relevant for companies looking to invest abroad. Relocation and 
decentralization are good ways to stay closer to the clients, but usually they are costly. 
The financial costs of relocation and decentralization increase also because they include 
significant compensations that must be offered to the personnel who must take care of 
their family while abroad. There are also non-monetary costs that people consider when 
deciding to work abroad for their company. The living conditions, the quality of schools 
where employees' children will attend, the language in which they'll be educated, the 
availability of medical services and insurance, the access to public services, the traffic 
regulations and the ease of obtaining a driver license, the cultural environment, the avail-
ability of familiar products and brands, the entertainment, the access to justice and its 
quality, etc. are all important factors. The less developed and less friendly a country is the 
more costly it is for companies to pay benefits in order to convince qualified workers and 
managers to accept relocation in a new environment (Jovancevic & Sevic, 2006; Lall, 
1997; Mowery & Oxley, 1995; Thiran & Yamawaki, 1995). 
The underdeveloped physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, airports, railroads, har-
bors) may be turned into opportunities for greenfield investments if barriers for these are 
identified and removed. Given its relative scarcity, the returns tend to be higher in pro-
jects addressing many existing bottlenecks. In such investments, the monetary return may 
constitute feasible vehicle for asset creation and finance (Canuto, 201 0). 
Concluding, we could say that engaging in a new generation of reforms could ensure 
good perspectives for Romania 's recovery after the economic crisis and future sustaina-
ble growth. The reforms should be focused on: 1) reducing the transaction costs of doing 
business; 2) building critical infrastructure and; 3) raising human capital. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Real GDP 
.r- ---------- ----- -- -- ---- ~······ ··-···· ····-~---~\ 
------------------~--------------------------------·--·- I 
2002 2003 20 10* 20 11 **201 5**' 
......... ··············~·····- ··-·-······--···- -····-··········-·-· 
4.5 5 0 2 5 
5.4 -1.5 1.6 3 
------ ------- --- ·-··-· 
- Estonia 7.9 7.2 1.8 3.5 3.1 
- Hungary 4.4 4.3 4.9 -6.3 0.6 2 3 
- Latvia 6.5 7.2 8.7 
- Lithuania 6.9 10.2 7.4 7.8 7.8 9.8 2.8 -14.8 1.3 3. 1 3.6 
- Poland 1.4 3.9 5.3 
- Romania 5.1 5.2 8.5 
f-----t---+----1---!- - -------- ·-· ------- -----------·-- -~-------- ·------
3.6 6.2 6.8 5 u 3.4 3.1 4.3 I 
A 1 I 7.9 6.3 7.3 -7 . I -1.9 1.5 4.2 ) --~---·---- ·--·- ··---···-······- -·-···~·-·······-··-·-······.- -·- ----- ··----·-.. . 
*Estimate 
** Projections 
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Appendix 2: Budget Deficit (% of GDP) 
····························--····-- -------------------·--··--·-----·········-·-··----------------------.,_ 
- Bu lgaria 
-czech Republic 
- Estonia 
f--------
- Latvia 
- Lithuania 
- Hungary 
~'''"' Romania 
-···-··---
Slovenia 
*Estimate 
**Projections 
2002 2003 2004 
-1.2 
-o.4 1 1.8 
-6.8 -6.6 -2.9 
0.3 ~:q_2~_ 
-------
-2.3 -1.6 ! -1 
-1 .9 -1.3 I -1.5 
-8.9 -7.2 -6.4 
-5 -6.2 -5.4 
-2 -1.5 -1.2 ~2:7 -l -2.2 
-2.5 
_..._ I\ 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 
1 1.9 1.1 1.7 -4.7 -3.8 -1.1 -1.8 
-3.6 -2.6 -0.7 -2.7 -5.8 -5 .2 -4.6 -4.2 
1.6 2.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 ~ ----0.4 -0.5 I -0.3 -4.1 -10.2 
-0.5 -0.4 -1 -3 .3 -9.2 -8.4 -7 -6.9 
-7.9 -9.4 -5 -3.7 -7.2 -3.8 4.7 -6.2 
-4.1 -3 .6 -1.9 -3.7 -7.2 -7.9 -6.6 -6 
-1.2 -2 .2 I -2.6 -5.7 -8.6 -7.3 -4.9 -3.5 
-
-1.4 -1 .3 I o -1 .8 -5.8 -5.8 -5.3 -4.7 
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Appendix 3: Current Account Deficit (% of GDP) 
2002 2003 2004 
··---·---·----·-·--· 
- Bulgaria -2.4 -5.5 -6.6 -12.4 -24.2 
-croatia -7.5 . -5.3 -4.4 -5.5 -9.2 
- Estonia -10.6 -1 1.3 -11.3 -10 - 15.3 -1 7.2 -9.7 4.5 4.2 3.4 
-Hungary -7 -8 -8.4 -7.2 -7.1 -6.5 -7.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 -1.8 
- Latvia -6.6 -8. 1 -12.9 -12.5 -22.5 -22.3 -13.1 5.5 2.9 -2.5 
- Lithuania -5.2 -6.9 -7.6 -7. 1 -10.7 -14.6 -12.2 4.2 1.9 0.2 -4.2 
- Poland -2.8 -2.5 -4 -1.2 -2.7 -4.8 -5. 1 -1.7 -2.4 -2.6 -2.4 
- Romania -3.3 -5 .8 -8.4 -9.8 -10.4 -13.4 -11.9 -4.5 -5.1 -5.4 -4.9 
*Estimate 
** Projections 
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Appendix 4: Consumer Prices (Average) 
··············································-····- ··-····················-
.............••...•••• ,, ... _________________________ 
\.. 
' 
-
' 
/~ 
"'-. ..,.~~  
.: ... 
•-. ..... ~~ --~ ~-  - ";;iii~""" -
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20 10* 2011 * 20 15* 
* * 
- Bulgaria 5.8 2.3 6. 1 6 7.4 7.6 12 2.5 2.2 2.9 3 
- croatia 1.7 1.8 2 3.3 3.2 2.9 6.1 2.4 1.9 2.8 3 
- Estonia 3.6 1.3 3 4.1 4.4 6.6 10.4 -0.1 2.5 2 2.5 
- Hungary 5.3 4.6 6.8 3.6 3.9 7.9 6.1 4.2 4.7 3.3 3 
- Latvia 2 2.9 6.2 6.9 6.6 10.1 15 .3 3.3 -1.4 0.9 1.4 
- Lithuania 0.3 -!.I 1.2 2.7 3.8 5.8 I I.! 4.2 l 1.3 1.7 
1-Poland 1.9 0.8 3.5 2.1 l 2.5 4.2 3.5 2.4 2.7 2.5 
---
- Romania 22 .5 15 .3 11.9 9 6.6 4.8 7.8 5.6 7.9 5.2 3 
*Estimate 
** Projections 
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Appendix 5: EU Membership 
Member states Year of EU entry Currency 
of the 
European 
Union 
Bulgaria 2007 
........ 
Lev 
Czech 2004-. ~ Czech koruna Republic 
Estonia 2004 ~ Euro 
Hungary 2004 >- ............ Forint 
Latvia 2004 Fi h EU Sixth EU Lats 
Lithuania 2004 Erj largement Enl~ment Litas 
Poland 2004 __./ / Zloty 
Slovakia 2004 / Euro 
Romania 2007 Leu 
